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RECENT DECISIONS
dispute was one between an employer and a union to which none of the em-
ployees of the disputant belonged. In each case the court decided that process
should issue as requested by the employer, that there could be no labor dispute
even under the recent statute, except where employees of the particular em-
ployer were parties to the dispute, although others than the employees might
participate in the struggle. United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 80 F. (2d)
1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) ; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 82 F. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 7th,
1936).
The Wisconsin statute is not literally identical with the federal act. Cf. Wis.
STAT. (1935) § 103.62 (3). The policy behind the Wisconsin statute, as inter-
preted by the Wisconsin court, permits labor unions to affect contractual rela-
tionships among many persons not directly interested in union affairs. Perhaps
the statute was meant to prescribe exactly that. There is, nevertheless, some
difference of opinion as to what it was meant to cover. And there is some rea-
son to suggest that a statute prescribing a policy as broad as that recognized
in the instant case violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court as now constituted has stood by earlier decisions of the
Court on minimum wage legislation which the Court felt did interfere with
bargainings between employers and employees. Morehead v. Tipaldo, 56 Sup.
Ct. 918, 80 Led. 921 (1936).
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-UNINCORPORATED AssocIATioNs-NoN-PRFIT SEEKING
GRouP.-An action was brought by the plaintiff, an art works concern, against
a state political committee, its chairman and three other committee members for
services rendered the committee under a contract. Plaintiff sought to hold the
individual defendants personally responsible. The petition alleged that the com-
mittee had been organized to promote the election of a certain gubernatorial
candidate; that to advertise and promote his candidacy, the contract with
the plaintiff had been made by the committee through its duly appointed
campaign manager; that the contract had been fully performed by the plaintiff,
but that the defendants had failed to pay. Testimony at the trial showed that
the manager had notified the creditor in making the contract that he would not
be responsible, that he had told the plaintiff that the committee was "good for
it." A demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was sustained. On appeal, held, judg-
ment affirmed. Only those members of an unincorporated political association
who authorized or ratified the transaction are liable on a contract made in
behalf of the committee. There was no proof that any member of the com-
mittee knew that the manager made the contract with the intention of binding
the members individually, or that any member ratified or thereafter assented
to his liability thereon. A'merican Art Works, Inc. v. Republican State Cons-
mittee, (Okla. 1936) 60 P. (2d) 786.
An action to enforce a liability incurred by a voluntary unincorporated asso-
ciation must be brought against its individual members. Crawley v. American
Society of Equity, 153 Wis. 13, 139 N.W. 734 (1913). It is a generally accepted
rule that members of a voluntary association engaged in business to make a
profit are personally liable on a contract made in behalf of the association,
provided that the contract is within the scope of the association's business and
was entered into with actual or apparent authority. See Azzolina v. Order of
Sons of Italy, (Conn. 1935) 179 Atl. 201; Schuntacher v. Suner Telephone Co.,
161 Iowa 326, 142 N.W. 1034 (i913); McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 30
N.E. 728, 17 L.R.A. 204 (1892). But where the object of the association is not
business or profit there is a division of authority as to what circumstances
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render individual members personally liable on association contracts. Courts
agree that members who expressly authorize or subsequently ratify an associa-
tion obligation are liable on account of it. Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. 493, 39 Am. Rep.
818 (1881) ; Stege v. Louisville Courier Journal Co., 196 Ky. 795, 245 S.W. 504
(1922); Azzolina v. Order of Sons of Italy, supra; Schumacher v. Swnner
Telephone Co., supra. The difficulty arises in most cases where there is no
express authorization or ratification; here is the diversity of decision. The
Missouri Court of Appeals for St. Louis has held that where the chairman of a
political committee assumes to act for the committee in hiring a person, but is
not actually authorized to do so, individual members are not liable for the
services rendered, although the services are within the scope of the associa-
tion's purposes. Owen v. Hadley, 186 Mo. App. 1, 171 S.W. 973 (1914). It has
been held that members of a non-trading unincorporated telephone company are
not individually liable for money loaned to the company's manager for company
business on the ground that borrowing money was outside the ordinary inci-
dents of the business in question and because no express authority was given.
Schumacher v. Sumner Telephone Co., supra. Members of a committee for a
Confederate reunion have been held not personally liable for materials furnished
the committee, on the ground that the plaintiff knew the only funds the com-
mittee had were obtainable from popular subscription. Little Rock Manufac-
turing Co. v. Kavanaugh, 111 Ark. 575, 164 S.W. 289, 51 L.R.A. (N.s.) 406
(1914). And in New York an action for services rendered by an attorney em-
ployed by the president of a law enforcement league to carry out prosecutions
under laws which the league was formed to enforce could not be maintained
against an officer of the league, since there was nothing in the organization of
the association to indicate that members should be liable for debts transacted
by officers or committees. McCabe v. Goodfellow, supra. These cases relieve
individual members from responsibility either on the ground that they did not
expressly or impliedly authorize the various contracts or that there was no
particular fact to show that the members of the association expected to pledge
their personal responsibility for association debts. Other cases hold that mem-
bers of a voluntary association by the very fact of membership are personally
liable for debts incurred for association purposes during their membership. In
Connecticut the Supreme Court of Errors in holding members of a fraternal
lodge personally liable to sureties who were compelled to pay the lodge's notes,
said: "A person may authorize the obligation arising from a contract either
by becoming or remaining a member knowing that such a contract would be
reasonable and proper in order to carry out the purposes for which the asso-
ciation was formed .... " Azzolina v. Order of Sons of Italy, supra. The Wis-
consin court has used the same sort of language. A complaint against defend-
ants as members of a voluntary unincorporated religious society for a debt of
the society contracted by trustees who had power to incur debts for the asso-
ciation was held to state a valid cause of action against members of the society
individually. Sheey v. Blake, 72 Wis. 411, 39 N.W. 479 (1888). In a more recent
case, wherein the plaintiff had done printing for a political committee proinioting
a senatorial candidacy, and had relied on the committee for payment, facts
strikingly similar to those of the principal case, the Wisconsin court, holding
the members of the committee individually liable for the debt, stated: "Each
member of a voluntary association is liable for the debts thereof if incurred
during his period of membership and contracted for the purpose of carrying
out the objects for which the association was formed." Vader v. Ballou, 151
Wis. 577, 139 N.W. 413 (1913); see also Crawley v. American Society of Equity,
supra; cf. Vader v. Ballou, supra, with the principal case. PAUL G. NOELKE.
